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TEAMS, TEAMWORK, AND AUTOMATION IN AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL
Philip W. Maynard and Esa M. Rantanen
Aviation Human Factors Division, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Savoy, IL, USA
Many recent initiatives involving social psychology applications in the aviation world have redoubled the interest in
the concept of teams and teamwork. The importance of teamwork in airline cockpits, hailed as cockpit (or crew-)
resource management (CRM), has been recognized for a relatively long time. It is also widely agreed that extensive
and effective interaction among participants in the National Airspace System (NAS), pilots, air traffic controllers,
and airline operations personnel, is tantamount to the daily successes of the nation’s air transportation industry.
Team aspects in air traffic control (ATC) are, however, much more convoluted than intra-cockpit teams or top-level
teamwork between NAS elements. The ATC system involves a complicated network of facilities, technology, and
personnel, which all must interact synergistically, often under time pressure, to ensure safe, efficient, and orderly
flow of air traffic. It is perhaps due to this complexity that there has been a significant deficiency in research activity
relating to teamwork in ATC. Yet, inadequate coordination between controllers has been considered a causal factor
in a substantial proportion of low to moderate severity operational errors. Furthermore, automation tools developed
for controllers are primarily focused on supporting the individual controller, while many, if not all of ATC functions
are a team effort. In this paper we review the literature relevant to the team concept in the ATC domain, identify and
characterize the different teams controllers belong to either simultaneously (e.g., intra- and inter-facility teams) or in
different operational environments, and catalog the results from research literature as they pertain to the aforemen-
tioned teams in ATC and their specific characteristics. Our principal focus is on concepts such as taskload, work-
load, and situation awareness.  Within this framework, we also map recent automation applications to ATC teams,
hence highlighting their impact on the team dimension of human factors in ATC.
Introduction
It may be argued that the global air traffic control
(ATC) system forms the largest singular team in
aviation.  It involves a complicated network of facili-
ties, technology, and personnel which all must inter-
act synergistically and often under severe time pres-
sure to meet the ultimate objectives of ATC: safe,
efficient, and orderly flow of air traffic from one lo-
cation to another.  Despite these inherent characteris-
tics of the National Airspace System (NAS) in the
U.S. and its international constituents, air traffic
management (ATM) research with respect to automa-
tion-supported team decision-making has been fairly
sparse. In fact, there has been a significant deficiency
in objective scientific measures of ATC teamwork
alone (Bailey & Thompson, 2000).  Although this
area is novel and still emerging, its further study in
operational environments would potentially enhance
the effective use of automation to aid team decision-
making. Lapses in decision-making, coordination,
and planning have been implicated in accidents and
incidents alike and identified as latent problem areas
in the NAS. According to a study by Rogers and Nye,
coordination between controllers was considered a
causal factor in 15% of low to moderate severity op-
erational errors from 1988-1991 (Bailey, Broach,
Thompson, Enos, 1999). Fortunately, a newfound
interest has recently blossomed in this area due to the
strong infusion of new technology into the ATC sys-
tem and the foreseeable impact of automation on con-
trollers’ performance individually as well as on their
interactions as members of various teams.
Implementation of automation in the worldwide ATC
system’s team of personnel to create safer and more
efficient traffic management is easier said than done.
There are many different members within the ATC
system that have different and even conflicting strate-
gic and tactical goals. Supporting these occasionally
incongruent goals will require interfaces tailored to
each position and job responsibility. Evaluating such a
design has been described as a suitability assessment.
A suitability assessment is the third part of a three-
stage progressive assessment process geared towards
systematic evaluation of system usability and task suit-
ability of the system. Suitability assessments focus on
the match between the system design and the user’s
task. A system is considered suitable if design features
and functions support users well as they perform their
tasks (Sanford et al., 1993).  In this case, it is appropri-
ate to evaluate a system in the context of the control-
lers’ individual task of managing traffic while main-
taining established team responsibilities.
However, there is a pervasive tradeoff between indi-
vidual and team suitability assessments. Optimal
automation for an individual is not always ideal for
team performance (Hopkin, 1995). Tantamount in
implementing automation as a ‘team player’ is a sys-
tem that allows members of teams to maintain the
best possible shared situation awareness (SA) and
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mental models.  The importance of shared SA and
mental models is forcefully explained by Wickens et
al. (1998) and specifically in a study by Salas, Stout,
and Cannon-Bowers (1994).  This literature strongly
asserts the need for shared mental models and SA as
a linchpin for optimal team decision-making.  In this
paper, optimal team decision-making will be consid-
ered  a  function  of  a  team’s  performance  due  to  the
interdependent nature of personnel and equipment in
the NAS.
Current Automation Applications in ATC
We will discuss ATC team decision-making primar-
ily in the context of the latest ATC automation tools:
the Center-TRACON Automation System (CTAS)
and its components.  The User Request Evaluation
Tool (URET) and Surface management System
(SMS) are not part of the CTAS toolbox, but will also
be discussed.  More specifically, we will examine
how these systems present information to the indi-
vidual controller to support the underlying goals of
the NAS and the more immediate objectives of the
controller.  CTAS is highly functional in that it fea-
tures specific tools and interfaces for each control
position. Such features, however, may conflict with
established team norms and could undermine team
performance (Hopkin, 1995). Furthermore, the auto-
mation that reduces team norms and standards will
also disguise weakness or inconsistencies in team
performance.  This relates to actions of a controller
troubleshooting being less visible to someone who
might share the same problem.  Thus, a significant
aspect of implementing automation in the ATC do-
main would be evaluation of these consequences and
their relationship to safety. These safety conse-
quences currently are not directly apparent, however.
Issues with automation in ATC include the extent to
which team functions should be preserved and the
importance of better identifying these functions so
they aren’t discovered to be necessary after the
means to fulfill them have been automated out of the
system (Hopkin, 1995). The tradeoffs of shared situ-
ational awareness with team and individual perform-
ance will be discussed for each component of the
CTAS and their associated control positions.
CTAS
CTAS is a sophisticated system that consists of three
major automation tools: the Traffic Management Ad-
visor (TMA), Descent Advisor (DA), and the Final
Approach Spacing Tool (FAST). On the Sheridan
and Verplank (1978) scale, CTAS represents level 3
automation, where the controller is advised of action
to  take  but  has  the  option  to  disagree.  In  general,
CTAS is primarily concerned with downstream flow
and arrival traffic. As the name implies, it is utilized
by both TRACON and en route center controllers.
The TMA uses an interactive, menu driven timeline
and a plan view display for Graphical User Interfaces
(GUIs).  The DA and FAST use graphical advisories
and work in conjunction with the TMA kit.
SMS
Ground control of aircraft and scheduling of depar-
ture  runways  and  times  is  handled  by  tower  and
ground controllers who are assisted by the SMS. The
SMS advises and informs these controllers with run-
way balancing and departure schedule optimization
(Walton, Quinn, & Atkins, 2002). The SMS features
four types of displays at the controllers’ disposal:
maps,  timelines,  load  graphs,  and  tables.   The  map
display shows the location and direction of aircraft.
The timeline predicts when an aircraft will be at a
specific location (gate, runway etc), but does not
show current aircraft position.  Load graph displays
show the current and forecast demand on airport re-
sources.  Meanwhile, the Flight and status tables pro-
vide flight-specific information (e.g., OUT and OFF
times and departure runway; Atkins et al., 2004).
URET
The en route sector teams are assisted by the URET.
This particular tool, which is independent of CTAS,
allows these controllers to test scenarios of rerouting
without having to mentally extrapolate the flight
paths of numerous types of aircraft traveling at dif-
ferent speeds and altitudes. This tool takes into ac-
count, among other factors, aircraft performance and
weather conditions to create a 4-dimensional flight
profile of all aircraft. This is built into a human-
computer interface, which is in textual and graphical
format. The display provides the controller the ability
to view aircraft routes and altitudes, predicted con-
flicts, and trial plan results. In addition, the point-
and-click interface affords expedient entry and
evaluation of trial plan route, altitude, or speed
changes.  Any changes made to the aircraft’s flight
plan are automatically updated in the central Host
computer, which holds all flight plan information.
(Walker et al., 2000). On a strategic and tactical
level, this tool has the potential to reduce workload
significantly and will potentially allow en route sec-
tor teams to effectively manage a larger taskload as
traffic levels increase.
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A Hypothetical Case Study
We will next discuss the implications of these auto-
mated tools on team aspects of ATC performance by
a hypothetical case study, by following a generic
flight from point A to point B through the NAS.  The
role of automation in coordination and collaboration
between individual controllers will be highlighted.
Departure
After receiving their departure clearance from the
clearance delivery controller, a commercial airline
flight will typically be pushed back from the gate.  At
this point, the pilots’ journey begins by talking to a
ground controller, who will issue safe taxiing instruc-
tions to an active runway. At major airports, this is a
complex job, as the intersections of taxiways and run-
ways and sheer volume of traffic creates an intricate
labyrinth of pavement and airplanes. Once the flight is
at the intersection of a taxiway and the active runway,
it is handed off to a tower controller, who issues the
take-off clearance and is responsible for the initial de-
parture sequencing.  A human Traffic Management
Coordinator (TMC), or supervisor, ensures smooth
flow. Coordination demands concern appropriate as-
signment of runways to departing flights for least re-
stricted climb-outs and to minimize the delays between
successive departures, which are necessary for safe
separation and wake turbulence avoidance.
Control of aircraft on the ground at the airport is
augmented by the SMS. A simulation study by
Walton, et. al (2002) has revealed several points to
note in how the controllers who control departures
utilize this system to make decisions and handle air-
craft. This particular automation system has poten-
tially negative effects on shared situational aware-
ness, however. The root cause for this could be a re-
sult of different goals and displays that support these
goals. The TMC has strategic goals, while the ground
and local controllers have predominantly tactical
goals (Walton et. al, 2002). Therefore, ground and
tower controllers will allocate their attention to the
information available to them in order to suit their
tactical goals, while the TMC is looking at the big
picture and a different display to make strategic deci-
sions. The consequence is a decrease in shared situa-
tion awareness. Walton et al., (2002) reported con-
trollers experiencing information overload and over-
redundancy, which may cause cues to become selec-
tively filtered and processed according to salience
(Wickens & Hollands, 2000). Also, when workload
increases, controllers will further channel their ac-
tions and attention to support their job responsibilities
(Hopkin, 1995), thus decreasing teamwork. This
teamwork detriment could result in action decisions
being made with suboptimal SA. More specifically,
the controllers’ ability to perceive a change in the
environment, understand it, and predict the future
state will be compromised. In such an unforgiving
field as air traffic management, making decisions
based on suboptimal SA carries potentially dangerous
consequences.
To compound the situation, the simulator study re-
vealed reliability problems in the advisories, which
were partially due to algorithm problems (Walton et
al., 2002). Essentially, the same information with
different meaning to certain personnel is going to
have implications for how controllers in charge of
departure flow interact with those who actually ma-
nipulate the airplanes to create that flow. This situa-
tion is further complicated by less than acceptable
user ratings of automation reliability.
Enroute
Once  the  aircraft  is  airborne,  it  is  handed  off  to  the
departure controller, who will place the airplane on a
departure procedure to route them out of the terminal
airspace  and into  the  en  route  structure  of  the  NAS.
Next, the aircraft will be handed off to a controller in
an air route traffic control center (ARTCC, or center).
Most of the flight will be spent interacting with a
series  of  center  controllers  who  control  a  3-
dimensional block of airspace known as a sector.
Typically, sectors in ARTCCs are controlled by a
team of two controllers, a radar controller, or an “R-
side” controller, while and a flight data controller, or
“D-side” controller. The R-side controller is typically
charged with maintaining separation of the airplanes
in the sector, and this controller is the one who com-
municates verbally with aircraft over the radio.  The
D-side controller is responsible for coordinating the
transfer of control of aircraft to other sectors or facili-
ties, as well as providing a second opinion and safety
mechanism for the R-side controller (Bailey &
Willems, 2002).
The primary automation tool available for en route
sector teams, URET, fosters solid team decision-
making within the team.  The R-side controller re-
ceives a re-routing request from an aircraft and gives
the information to the D-side controller, who has
access to the URET. After testing the scenario or
creating a more acceptable one, the D-side controller
will inform his or her counterpart of the situation
(Wickens et al, 1998). This system fosters a shared
mental model because the D-side controller can only
work  with  the  information  he/she  is  given  by  the  R
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Side controller, which is a manifestation of their un-
derstanding of the situation.
One potential issue for further investigation in this case
is the compatibility of the URET with the CTAS’s
Traffic Management Advisor (TMA).  This tool aug-
ments the enroute and TRACON traffic management
controllers. The TMA develops a plan for each indi-
vidual aircraft and sequences multiple aircraft arrivals
in relationship with each other (Wickens et al, 1998).
If the en route sector teams are routing aircraft in a
manner contrary to the TMA or supervisors’ plan, the
TMA when combined with the URET could reallocate
workload for the users. On different levels, this idea
has been expressed consistently in the literature
(Wickens et al, 1998, Sanford et al, 1999, Sanford et
al, 1993).  Essentially, the operators of the URET and
TMA would have to effectively communicate to en-
sure their goals and SA is consistent.
The last sector to handle an aircraft before it re-enters
the terminal environment works with the Descent
Advisor (DA) CTAS tool. This tool assists control-
lers by structuring advisories to create a seamless
transition from the en route phase of flight to the ar-
rival.   There is often a bottleneck at this point in the
system, and this automation is an effort to mitigate
the arrival bottleneck.
The DA advisories include fuel-efficient top-of-
descent (TOD) points, speed profiles, altitudes, and
vectors. Conflict resolution and management con-
formance advisories are supported automatically or
semi-automatically through scenario planning (San-
ford et al, 1999). This system contributes to team
decision-making in that its primary objective is to
integrate the notoriously separate tasks of en route
control to arrival sequencing. Also, it adds a third
dimension by ensuring the traffic management per-
sonnel’s policy is being implemented in the system’s
output. In theory, the system integrates all involved
parties’ goals to create common solutions.
Despite the commendable goals of the DA tool, it is
not free of automation-related human factors con-
cerns.  A primary concern in the evaluation literature
is that of redistributing workload. The DA essentially
reallocates the human’s role in the system by forcing
them to perform primarily strategic control action as
opposed to the tactical control they exercised previ-
ously (Sanford et al, 1999). Further problems with
reallocating workload lie in the new tasks required of
the human operator.  In the case of the DA, the sys-
tem performs all tactical decisions in the form of a
level 3 automation advisory. As the human’s role
shifts to performing strategic tasks, their mental
model is now sub-optimal due to the inherent fact
that automation represents data in terms of a direct
visualization (Pea, 1993; Salomon, 1993; Wickens,
1992). The operators are less informed about how the
tactical decisions were made, thus their mental model
is degraded because they are not actually thinking
about the situation. Because effective strategic deci-
sion-making is comprised of numerous tactical deci-
sions, fully optimal strategic decision-making may
possibly  be  hindered  by  the  DA.  An automated  sys-
tem  such  as  the  DA  is  consistent  with  the  assertion
that positive automation attributes of low workload
and good prediction have implications for a good
mental model (Wickens, 1992).
Arrival
As the airplane transitions from the en route phase of
flight to the arrival, the aircraft control is handed over to
the TRACON controller. These controllers primarily
sequence aircraft for approaches and issue landing
clearances.  Once the airplane is clear of the active run-
way on a taxiway, the control is once again passed to the
Ground controller for the taxi clearance to the gate.
Efficient aircraft arrival is aided by the Final Ap-
proach Spacing Tool (FAST) component of CTAS.
Currently, a passive level 3 automation version of
FAST is used, referred to as pFAST. The pFast util-
izes advanced logic and algorithms to sequence air-
craft by advising the controller. It also performs run-
way allocation tasks. This tool aids a task that is no-
torious for very high workload and even has made a
significant impact on improving throughput. Dallas-
Fort Worth reported a 9-13 % increase in throughput
as a result of pFAST implementation (Quinn & Rob-
inson, 2000). Proper flow management by supervi-
sors should enhance the effectiveness of pFAST.
The interdependent nature of air traffic control teams
and automation’s effect on their performance is quite
evident. From a review of automated systems in
ATC, there are many positive attributes associated
with their operational implementation. There are also
positive aspects in the design and evaluations of these
systems, as experienced air traffic controllers are
highly involved in the design and evaluation proc-
esses (Quinn & Robinson, 2000; Harwood, 1993;
Sanford et al., 1993,1999; Walton et al., 2002).  The
overall system benefits are not without cost to shared
SA at some point in the system. This shared SA is the
linchpin in effective and optimal decision-making
with automated traffic management tools.
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Discussion
The current automation interventions to aid the air
traffic controller have caused the ATC teamwork
concept to evolve and adapt. Although each system is
lauded for key positive technological and task-driven
features, several factors indicate a guarded approach
to automation implementation should be followed.
The positive aspects of innovative automation ap-
proaches to ATC are the benefits for documented
throughput and alleviation of some time-pressured,
high-workload problem solving tasks which control-
lers would find increasingly difficult in the ever-
growing volume of future air traffic. Some automa-
tion,  such  as  the  URET,  actually  does  foster  strong
team decision-making on account of both individuals
utilizing the same information to compose a mental
model and conduct action decisions with the same
information at their disposal.
However, the drawbacks to some automated ap-
proaches suggest more work will need to be accom-
plished in determining optimal automation suitability
for the individual and the team’s task environment.
This involves a strong foundation of understanding
more precisely how air traffic control teams interact
and how automation can best support this interaction.
More specifically, differences in strategic and tactical
goals between two different tiers in the ATC system
can invite difficulty in sharing SA. Also, this type of
situation could result from the interaction of two in-
dependently designed automation systems. Other
issues include the redistribution of workload among
the  various  ATC specialists  and managers.   Further-
more, automation supporting direct visualization can
hinder a controller’s problem-solving skills (Pea,
1993; Salomon, 1993; Wickens, 1992). On the tech-
nological side, unreliable automation can produce an
entirely separate set of human performance problems,
particularly involving trust and reliability issues.
Despite the drawbacks, automation and advanced
technology implementation has much potential to
assist controllers and improve safety. However, this
safety improvement potential can be realized by con-
structively analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of
automation in the context of the concept of ATC as a
single large team.
Conclusion
Areas for future research include the cost-benefit
analyses of automated tools and the specific effect of
their implementation on controller workload and
team decision-making. It is a realistic possibility that
future air traffic demands will dictate that controllers
and traffic managers must operate with a certain
amount of a decrease in shared situational awareness
in order to meet the demands.  These studies per-
formed in the context of future air traffic demands
will be beneficial in ensuring excessively severe la-
tent issues will not manifest themselves later.  Given
the complexity of the ATC system, these evaluations
are difficult but necessary in preparing for the future
air traffic demands.
The task of managing traffic in the NAS is certainly a
daunting one, as air traffic is projected to continue to
increase in the near future. Effective understanding of
how ATC teams function and how to best support
team coordination with team-centered automation
approaches will improve shared situational awareness
of all team members and will consequently enhance
the safety and efficiency of operations.
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